In Re Baby Girl Doe, 865 P.2d 1090

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Supreme Court of Montana.
1996
July
ADOPTION OF RIFFLE

ADOPTION OF RIFFLE Supreme Court of Montana. (Jul 30, 1996) Jul 30, 1996
Subsequent
References
CaseIQ^TM
(AI Recommendations)

277 Mont. 388 922 P.2d 510 53 St. Rep. 723

Important Paras

The Sirokys contend that the District Court should have made a "best interest" analysis under § 40-8-109, MCA, outside the restrictions, preferences or limitations of the ICWA. However, since we affirm the District Court's determination that the ICWA applies to this adoption, a determination of "best interests" under Montana law would be inappropriate. The ICWA expresses the presumption that in an adoptive placement of an Indian child, the child's best interests are best served by placement with an extended family member. 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). To overcome this preference, a party must establish the existence of "good cause to the contrary." 25 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). BIA guidelines provide "good cause to the contrary" must be based upon one or more of the following considerations:Go to
As the Court correctly observes, the ICWA defines an "Indian child" as "any unmarried person who is under age eighteen and is either (a) a member of an Indian tribe or (b) is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the biological child of a member of an Indian tribe." See 25 U.S.C. § 1903(4). I also agree with the Court that a Tribe's determination that a child is "a member or eligible for membership" is conclusive for purposes of the ICWA.Go to
We believe, however, that a finding of good cause cannot be based simply on a determination that placement outside the preferences would be in the child's best interests. The plain language of the Act read as a whole and its legislative history clearly indicate that state courts are a part of the problem the ICWA was intended to remedy. See Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 490 U.S. at 44-45, 109 S.Ct. at 1606-07. . . . The best interests of the child standard, by its very nature, requires a subjective evaluation of a multitude of factors, many, if not all of which are imbued with the values of majority culture. It therefore seems "most improbable" that Congress intended to allow state courts to find good cause whenever they determined that a placement outside the preferences of § 1915 was in the Indian child's best interests. Cf. Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians, 490 U.S. at 45, 109 S.Ct. at 1606-07.
Matter of Custody of S.E.G. (Minn. 1994), 521 N.W.2d 357, 362-63.Go to
In any adoptive placement of an Indian child under State law, a preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with
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The Sirokys ask this Court to adopt the rationale of the California appellate court in its recent decision in In re Bridget R. (Cal.Ct.App. 1996) 49 Cal.Rptr.2d 507. In In re Bridget R., the California court held that the ICWA could not be constitutionally applied in the absence of evidence that the biological parents have a significant social, cultural, or political relationship with the Tribe. In re Bridget R., 49 Cal.Rptr.2d at 526.Go to
I concur in the result reached in the Court's opinion and with much of what is said therein. On the basis of the record before us, however, I disagree with the Court's conclusion that Jessica is an "Indian child" as defined by the ICWA and its related conclusion that the ICWA applies. I would affirm the District Court on the basis of that court's determination that Jessica's adoption by her uncle, John Garlick, is in her best interests.Go to
We review district court conclusions of law to determine whether the court's interpretation of law is correct. Adoption of Riffle, 902 P.2d at 544 (citing Steer, Inc. v. Department of Revenue (1990), 245 Mont. 470, 474, 803 P.2d 601, 603).Go to
In the instant case, the Tribe filed papers with the District Court officially recognizing Jessica as an Indian child and a "member of the tribe" under the provisions of the ICWA. Contrary to the Sirokys' contention, enrollment of the child in the Tribe is not required so long as the Tribe recognizes the child as a member. In re Junious M. (Cal.Ct.App. 1983), 193 Cal.Rptr. 40, 44. Enrollment and membership are not synonymous. In re Baby Boy Doe (Idaho 1993), 849 P.2d 925, 931. Enrollment is a common but not exclusive evidentiary means of determining membership in a tribe. Baby Boy Doe, 849 P.2d at 931 (citing 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584, 67,586 (1979)). Given the Tribe's determination that Jessica is an Indian child, we hold that the District Court correctly concluded that the Tribe's determination was conclusive.Go to
(2) other members of the Indian child's tribe; orGo to
In 1978, Congress passed the ICWA in response to a significant threat to the integrity of Indian cultures caused by the alarmingly high incidence of often unwarranted removal of Indian children from their families. 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4). Congress declared that "it is the policy of this Nation to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families. . . ." 25 U.S.C. § 1902. As this Court has previously stated, we share Congress' concern and support its policy. In re Baby Girl Jane Doe (1993), 262 Mont. 380, 385, 865 P.2d 1090, 1092; In re M.E.M. (1981), 195 Mont. 329, 333, 635 P.2d 1313, 1315-16. In In re M.E.M., we stated that it was our constitutional duty to preserve the unique cultural heritage and integrity of the American Indians. Mont. Const. art. X, § 1(2); In re M.E.M., 635 P.2d at 1316. Moreover, in Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield (1989), 490 U.S. 30, 109 S.Ct. 1597, 104 L.Ed.2d 29, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the intent and purposes of the ICWA. In In re Baby Girl Doe, we discussed Mississippi Choctaw at length and concluded that "the principal purposes of the Act are to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes by preventing further loss of their children; and to protect the best interests of Indian children by retaining their connection to their tribes." In re Baby Girl Doe, 865 P.2d at 1095. Accordingly, we hold that the application of the ICWA does not deny Jessica her constitutional rights and we decline to adopt the California Court's approach in In re Bridget R. Go to
(i) The request of the biological parents or the child when the child is of sufficient age.

(ii) The extraordinary physical or emotional needs of the child as established by testimony of a qualified expert witness.

(iii) The unavailability of suitable families for placement after a diligent search has been completed for families meeting the preference criteria.
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Guidelines for State Courts; Indian Child Custody Proceedings, 44 Fed. Reg. 67,584, 67,594 (1979).Go to
At least two courts which have interpreted the "good cause" exception of 25 U.S.C. § 1915 have determined that courts may consider the best interests of the child in determining whether the exception applies. Matter of Adoption of F.H. (Alaska 1993), 851 P.2d 1361, and Adoption of M. (Wash.Ct.App. 1992), 832 P.2d 518. The Minnesota Supreme Court, however, has rejected this interpretation and we agree. The Minnesota Supreme Court held that:Go to
Notwithstanding my disagreement with the Court over whether the ICWA applies here, however, I also would affirm the District Court. The District Court determined that it is in Jessica's best interests to be adopted by her uncle, John Garlick, and there is a surfeit of evidence on the record to support that determination. Go to

In Re Baby Girl Doe, 865 P.2d 1090

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